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PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION IN THE TREATY-




The question as to how far the treaty-making power of the executive
(generally vested in the Head of the State), should and can in fact be
put under the control of parliament is a problem of a general charac-
ter; this problem has been known in all democratic countries for a long
time.I
It should be pointed out from the outset that the Netherlands form part
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Besides the Netherlands (the terri-
tory in Europe), the Kingdom presently comprises the Netherlands An-
tilles and Aruba (the territories in the Caribbean). 2 Only the Kingdom
of the Netherlands has legal capacity under international law and, conse-
quently, only the Kingdom has the power to conclude treaties. This en-
tails that treaties are negotiated by the Kingdom and it is the Kingdom
that becomes party to any treaty.
The separate parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands are united on
the legal basis of the Charter of the Kingdom ("Charter"). 3 The Charter
is the highest national legal instrument in the Kingdom and the Constitu-
tion of the Netherlands ("Constitution") is subordinate to it. By virtue
of the Charter, however, the provisions of the Constitution often apply to
matters that are of concern to the Kingdom as a whole and not just to
the Netherlands. The Charter determines which matters are of concern
to the Kingdom as a whole. 4 These include, inter alia, foreign relations
* Dr. Pieter van Dijk is a State Councillor, and Ms. Bahiyyih G. Tahzib a member of the
legal staff of the Council of State of the Netherlands. The opinions expressed are those of the authors
personally and not necessarily those of the Council of State. The authors wish to thank the Director-
ate of Treaties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, and the Documentation Divi-
sion and Library of the Council of State for their kind assistance.
1. Haro F. van Panhuys, The Netherlands Constitution and International Law, 47 AM. J.
INT'L L. 537, 543 (1953).
2. On January 1, 1986, the island of Aruba, which used to be part of the Netherlands Antilles,
attained internal autonomy within the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
3. For the most recent text of the Charter, see Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden
[Bulletin of Acts, Orders & Decrees] No. 453 (1985) [hereinafter Stb.]. See generally W. VAN
HELSDINGEN, HET STATUUT VOOR HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN: WORDINGSGES-
CHIEDENIS, COMMENTAAR EN PRAKTIJX [THE CHARTER FOR THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHER-
LANDS: GENESIS, COMMENTARY & PRACTICE] (1957).
4. Charter, supra note 3, art. 3.
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(Article 3(l)(b) of the Charter).5
According to Article 25(1) of the Charter, the Netherlands Antilles
and Aruba cannot against their will be bound by a treaty of an economic
or financial nature. Article 25(2) of the Charter provides that existing
treaties in those fields cannot be denounced without their consent. When
the Netherlands Antilles or Aruba wish to enter into economic or finan-
cial treaties, they need the co-operation of the Government of the King-
dom in concluding such treaties. Practice has shown that, there is
considerable latitude in the application of this provision. Thus, co-opera-
tion is given for any kind of treaty the Netherlands Antilles or Aruba
wish to conclude.
Article 24(l)juncto Article 27 of the Charter furthermore stipulates
that the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba must be involved in the negotia-
tion and implementation of treaties which are deemed to affect them
within the meaning of the Charter. In order to avoid disputes over
whether or not a treaty will affect the Netherlands Antilles and/or
Aruba, the Government of the country concerned is informed about any
intention to negotiate and conclude a treaty. It is then left to that coun-
try's Government to decide whether it wishes a treaty to apply to its
territory. Simultaneously with the submission of treaties to the Nether-
lands Parliament, treaties are forwarded to the Representative Bodies of
the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. In the case a treaty is submitted for
tacit approval to the Parliament (Article 24(2) of the Charter), the Minis-
ters Plenipotentiary of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba representing
their country in The Hague have the right to express the wish that the
treaty be subject to express approval. In the case a treaty is submitted for
express approval to the Parliament, the Ministers Plenipotentiary of the
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba may present a report on the treaty. Dur-
ing the debate on the treaty in the Netherlands Parliament, the respective
representative bodies mentioned are entitled to attend and to furnish any
information they consider desirable. In addition, the Ministers Plenipo-
tentiary of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba may designate one or
more special delegates to participate in the debates. 6
This paper is confined to the Kingdom's territory in Europe - the
Netherlands. One must, however, keep in mind that the Netherlands
independently does not have a separate treaty-making power and that
this power rests with the Kingdom.
5. See also Charter, supra note 3, art. 11(3).
6. For an elaborate discussion on treaties with the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, see Henri-
cus Sondaal, Some Features of Dutch Treaty Practice, 19 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 179, 229-37 (1988).
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Section II is devoted to the domestic status of treaties in the Dutch
legal order. It discusses the internal and direct effect of treaties within
the Dutch legal order and their precedence over Dutch law, including
the Constitution. Section II further describes the fact that the Dutch
courts may and must review applicable law, including the Constitution,
for its conformity with the (self-executing) provisions of treaties. Section
III deals with the process of treaty-making in the Dutch constitutional
democracy. It discusses the power to conclude treaties, the procedures
concerning the approval of treaties, the provisional application of trea-
ties, and the ratification of treaties. Section IV specifically addresses the
qualifications which may be added to treaties at the national level and
Section V contains some concluding observations.
II. THE DOMESTIC STATUS OF TREATIES IN
THE DUTCH LEGAL ORDER
7
The relation between international law and municipal law is a subject
with which many generations of lawyers have wrestled, are wrestling
and will continue to wrestle.
8
When discussing the treaty-making process in the Netherlands, it is im-
portant to keep in mind the domestic status of treaties9 in the internal
legal order of the Netherlands since this status differs from that in most
countries. To clarify the picture, one has to distinguish and define the
following concepts:
A. the legal force of treaties;
B. the internal effect of treaties;
C. the direct effect of treaties; and
D. the precedence of treaties.
7. This Section is based on Pieter van Dijk, Domestic Status of Human-Rights Treaties and the
Attitude of the Judiciary: The Dutch Case, in PROGRESS IN THE SPIRITS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 631,
633-39 (Festschrift fir Felix Ermacora) (Manfred Nowak et al. eds., 1988).
8. Lambertus Erades, International Law and the Netherlands Legal Order, in 3 INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS 375, 376 (Haro F. van Panhuys et al. eds., 1980). For the
main theories as to the relationship between international law and municipal law, see, e.g., Erica-
Irene A. Daes, Status of the Individual and Contemporary International Law, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1989/40 (1989) at 4-22.
9. The term "treaty" is used here in a broader sense than defined and described in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679
(1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Sondaal has defined the term "treaty" (verdrag) within the
Dutch legal order as follows: [I]n practice the Netherlands regards an instrument as a treaty, irre-
spective of nomenclature or form, if the Kingdom has reached a consensus ad idem with one or more
States or international organizations - or entities with limited international legal personality and
the power to conclude treaties (of certain types) - with the object of bringing about (or changing)
an obligation under international law." Sondaal, supra note 6, at 184. See also HENRICUS
SONDAAL, DE NEDERLANDSE VERDRAGSPRAKTIJK [DUTCH TREATY PRACTICE] ch. 1 (1986). It
must be stressed, however, that unwritten treaties are avoided in practice to obviate problems in
establishing their existence and content.
1991]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
A. The Legal Force of Treaties
The legal force of a treaty vis-d-vis a State depends on whether the
treaty has entered into force, both in general and for that particular
State. Both are determined by ratification. Sometimes a distinction is
made between ratification by the original signatory States and accession
by other States. 10 This distinction, however, has no practical meaning.
The fact that a treaty has entered into force for a particular State
means that this State is bound by its provisions. The character and scope
of the legal obligations ensuing for the State from such a legally binding
treaty, however, may vary quite substantially from treaty to treaty, and
even within one and the same treaty. This character and this scope are
determined by the individual provisions of the treaty as interpreted ac-
cording to the general principles of treaty interpretation. 1 Some treaty
provisions only determine a certain result which the Contracting States
must ensure,12 while others also indicate certain ways and means to bring
about this result. 13 In some cases the treaty obligations have to be ful-
filled completely at the moment of the entry into force of the treaty,' 4
while in other cases the States are required to do so only progressively.15
This character and this scope, in their turn, determine the character and
the scope of the State's discretionary powers concerning these
obligations.
10. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 48, 52,
999 U.N.T.S. 171; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, arts. XXXIII,
XXVI(5)(c), 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (article XXXIII, the "normal" procedure for membership) (article
XXVI(5)(c), "sponsorship"); the current version is contained in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TAR-
iFFs & TRADE, 4 BAsic INSTRUMENTS & SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) ("GATT") which specifies
the two basic ways for a country to become a Contracting Party to GATT other than as an original
signatory to the Protocol of Provisional Application for GATT.
11. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, arts. 31-33.
12. See, e.g., the prohibition of torture in Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, Europ. T.S.
No. 5. [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
13. Thus, be it in rather vague terms, Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights prescribes the adoption of "such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to
give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant." But see, e.g, the very detailed means
summed up in Article 10 of the European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, Europ. T.S. 35, concerning
the right to vocational training.
14. This is, for instance, the case for all the obligations laid down in the European Convention
on Human Rights. Article 1 provides that the States "shall secure to everyone within their jurisdic-
tion the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention."
15. See, e.g., the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, art. 2(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, which contains an obligation for each of the States Parties "to take
steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant .... "
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B. The Internal Effect of Treaties
The internal effect of a treaty relates to the effect given to the treaty
in the domestic 16 legal order of the State. The implementation of most
treaties has certain internal implications. These treaties embody the obli-
gation on the part of the States Parties to ensure their internal effect in
the domestic legal order. 17 As a rule, and unless provided otherwise in
the treaty itself, this is merely an obligation of result, while it is left to the
State in question to choose the ways and means. International law has
not (yet) developed any rules on this matter.18
There are three principal ways of giving internal effect to an interna-
tional treaty, viz., adoption, incorporation, and transformation. In a sys-
tem of adoption, the treaty provisions have legal effect as such in the
domestic legal order. These provisions maintain their international char-
acter within the national legal order in which they are applied. At the
basis of this system is the monist view.19 According to the monist view,
international law and municipal law are concomitant aspects of a single
legal order, i.e., law in general. 20 In the case of incorporation, treaty obli-
gations are incorporated into domestic law and are applied as national
law, while transformation means that the treaty provisions are trans-
formed into domestic law by means of legislation amending or supple-
menting existing domestic law. Both incorporation and transformation
are based upon the dualist (or pluralist) view. According to the dualist
view, international law and municipal law are two separate legal systems
which operate on different levels.21 In a mitigated dualist system, the
national statute approving the treaty and authorizing its ratification si-
multaneously incorporates the treaty in the domestic legal system.22 As
16. The terms "municipal law," "national law," "domestic law," and "internal law" will be
used interchangeably in this article and are meant to contrast with international law.
17. Advisory Opinion No. 10, Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, 1921 P.C.I.J. (ser.
B) No. 10, at 21 (Feb. 21).
18. See, e.g., Max Sorensen, Obligations d'un dtat partie d un traitd sur le plan de son droit
interne, in LES DROITS DE L'HoMME EN DRorr INTERNE ET DRorr INTERNATIONAL 35, 44 (1968)
(Proceedings of the Second International Colloquy on the European Convention on Human Rights,
Vienna, Oct. 18-20, 1965).
19. For monism and dualism, see generally Daes, supra note 8, at 4-7; HENRY SCHERMERS &
DENIS WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 105-10 (4th ed.
1987); Henry Schermers, in Netherlands, 7 UNITED KINGDOM NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF COM-
PARATIVE LAW; THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Rob-
erts eds., 1987) [hereinafter Netherlands]; Luzius WILDHABER, TREATY-MAKING POWER AND
CONSTITUTION: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY 3-5, 152-53, 222-26 (1971); IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 2 (4th ed. 1990).
20. See Hans Kelsen, Die Einheit von V6lkerrecht und staatlichem Recht, 19 Za6RV 234 (1958).
21. See, already almost a century ago, HERMANN TRIEPEL, VOLKERRECHT UND
LANDESRECHT 19-20 (1899).
22. There is no consensus on the question whether the treaty then becomes part of domestic
1991]
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long as the incorporation or transformation has not taken place or has
not been completed, the treaty may have internal effect only in virtue of
the so-called "rule of presumption," according to which the municipal
courts, when interpreting and applying domestic law, start from the pre-
sumption that the legislature did not intend to enact or maintain law
contrary to the State's treaty obligations.
23
Which of the systems is followed in a particular State is determined
by that State's constitutional law and practice. States may, of course,
commit themselves internationally to a certain method of incorporation
with respect to one particular treaty or a particular system of interna-
tional law. For instance, according to the case law of the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Communities, the Member States have done so in
relation to Community law when they established or acceded to the
Communities. The Court views the legal order of the European Commu-
nities to be of a sui generis character. The relationship between Commu-
nity law and the domestic legal orders of the Member States is, according
to the Court, based on the monist theory.
24
The internal effect of treaties in the legal order of the Netherlands
has been expressly regulated in a monist way since the 1953 revision of
the Netherlands Constitution. 25 Before that time, the same applied in
virtue of a well-established rule of customary law which had already
found recognition in scattered legislative provisions. 26 Thus, a treaty
which for the Netherlands has entered into force automatically becomes
part of Dutch law after it has been published, without any separate act of
incorporation or transformation being required. Schermers describes
what influence the monist system has in practice on Dutch negotiators of
treaties in the following way:
Dutch negotiators of treaties sometimes feel it as a burden that the
treaty which they conclude becomes part of domestic law. Negotiators
from other countries may lightheartedly accept all sorts of treaty obli-
gations which are not subsequently incorporated into their domestic
law; CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS BEFORE DOMESTIC
COURTS 163 (1981). On "mitigated dualism", see SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK, supra note 19, at
107-08.
23. See Oscar Schachter, The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic Law, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL & POLITICAL RIGHTS 311, 318-19
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
24. See, e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend v. Loos, E.C.R. 12 (Feb. 5, 1963); reprinted in I COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 82 (1963). The Court's conclusion is not based on the express intention of the States,
but is drawn from the objective of the Community as confirmed in several treaty provisions.
25. For the importance of this revision on the treaty-making power and the effect of treaties, see
van Panhuys, supra note 1, at 537 (et seq). See also Haro F. van Panhuys, The Netherlands Constitu-
tion and International Law: A Decade of Experience, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 88 (1964).
26. See Erades, supra note 8, at 385.
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legal systems and therefore become dead letters, whilst a Dutch negoti-
ator always has to take into account that treaty obligations may be
invoked in court. Legally, this argument is irrelevant as all treaty part-
ners are bound by the text of the treaty, but in practice it carries some
weight.
27
Article 93 of the present - the 1983 version - Netherlands Consti-
tution 28 provides that provisions of treaties and of decisions of interna-
tional organizations which, according to their contents, may be binding
on everyone, shall have that binding effect as from the time of their publi-
cation. 29 The words "which, according to their contents, may be binding
on everyone" (die naar hun inhoud een ieder kunnen verbinden) are gen-
erally understood to refer to the self-executing character which is re-
quired for their application by Dutch courts ("direct effect"; see section
11(C)). 30 This does not mean, of course, that non-self-executing provi-
sions have no internal effect in the Netherlands. They are binding, as
such, upon all branches of the central and local legislative and executive
authorities, which also have to enforce the resulting obligations within
the scope of their powers.
31
C. The Direct Effect of Treaties
The direct effect of a treaty relates to its applicability by domestic
courts without the necessity of any further implementation or execution
by an international or national authority.3 2 A provision of a treaty which
has this character is often called "self-executing."
33
27. See Schermers, Netherlands, supra note 19, at 112.
28. For the English translation of the Netherlands Constitution as a whole (albeit with several
shortcomings), see 11 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert A. Blaustein &
Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1990).
29. Since 1951, the text of all treaties signed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and of treaties
to which the Kingdom intends to accede, and the translation of the treaties into Dutch are officially
published in the Treaty Series of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Tractatenblad van het Koninkrjk
der Nederlanden [hereinafter Tractatenblad]. This official publication of the Government also
presents information about the dates on which other States have become parties and on when the
treaty has entered into force.
30. On the meaning of this phrase, see Erades, supra note 8, at 406-14. See also Judgment of
Nov. 28, 1961, Public Prosecutor v. G.J.C.C., Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Dutch Supreme
Court], 1962 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie [N.J.], No. 90; 11 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 83, 85 (1964),
where the Supreme Court held as follows: "According to their nature these treaty provisions are apt
to be directly applied. Therefore they are 'provisions of agreements binding upon everyone ...."
31. See Erades, supra note 8, at 403, who also indicates in what respects the courts may never-
theless have to pay attention to certain of these provisions. On the latter issue, see also Evert A.
Alkema, The Application of Internationally Guaranteed Human Rights in the Municipal Legal Order,
in ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 181, 182-83 (Fritz
Kalshoven et al. eds., 1980).
32. For this and other possible definitions, see Albert Bleckmann, L'applicabiliti directe du
droit communautaire, in LES RECOURS DES INDIVIDUS DEVANT LES INSTANCES NATIONALES EN
CAS DE VIOLATION DU DROIT EUROPfEN 84, 87-90 (Albert Bleckmann et al. eds., 1978).
33. On - the sometimes rather confusing - terminology, see J.A. Winter, Direct Applicability
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
As a rule it is for the domestic court to decide whether a treaty
provision is self-executing or not. It may well be, however, that the
treaty itself contains prescriptions to that effect. Thus, Article 189 of the
EEC Treaty provides that a regulation made by the Council or Commis-
sion "shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Mem-
ber States." This is, however, rather exceptional. Generally, the
Contracting Parties are not willing to bind themselves - and their courts
- beforehand. The law of the European Communities constitutes an
exception also in this respect that in the final resort it is not the domestic
court, but the Court of Justice of the European Communities which de-
termines whether a certain provision is directly applicable or not. This is
due to the preliminary ruling procedure of Article 177 of the EEC
Treaty.34 Other international courts are not faced with the issue, because
they are merely called upon to review the final result which has been
reached at national level - be it through the direct application of the
treaty provision concerned by the domestic courts or not - for its con-
formity with the treaty.
As has been indicated earlier, Article 93 of the Netherlands Consti-
tution refers to the self-executing character of treaty provisions as a re-
quirement for their application by Dutch courts.35 The question of
whether a treaty provision is self-executing or not is left to the municipal
courts. As the Netherlands Government puts it in its Memorandum of
Reply (memorie van antwoord) to the First Chamber concerning the
comparable Article 65 of the 1953 version of the Netherlands
Constitution:
Finally this is a question to be determined by the courts, since, accord-
ing to Article 65, the courts and not the legislature are charged with
interpreting international agreements in a binding way. 36
In 1962, the Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court) ruled that the ques-
tion whether a treaty provision is directly applicable or not is a question
of treaty-law rather than a question of Netherlands law.37 The Dutch
courts may answer this question only when the treaty does not include
and Direct Effect; Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law, in 9 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 425 (1972).
34. And of the identical Article 50 of the European Atomic Energy Community Treaty. Com-
parable Article 41 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty is of a more limited scope.
35. See supra section 11(B).
36. Quoted by Erades, supra note 8, at 407.
37. See Judgment of May 18, 1962, Bosch G.m.b.H. N.V. v. de Geus en Uitdenbogerd, HR,
1965 N.J. No. 115; 12 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 318, 318-22 (1965). See also Judgment of Nov. 28,
1961, Pub. Prosecutor v. G.J.C.C., HR, 1962 N.J. No. 90; 11 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 83 (1964);
Judgment of May 4, 1954, Pub. Prosecutor v. J. de B., HR, 1954 N.J. No. 382; 2 NETH. INT'L L.
REV. 94 (1955).
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one or more provisions for its interpretation. 38 The issue is of great im-
portance since it determines the scope of judicial review of Netherlands
law and administrative action for their conformity with treaty provisions.
There are no indications that the Dutch courts are particularly restrictive
or particularly liberal with respect to accepting the direct effect of
treaties.
39
D. The Precedence of Treaties
When a treaty provision is considered to be directly applicable as
international law, the question arises of its legal status in relation to pro-
visions of domestic law which are not in conformity therewith. In a du-
alist system, a treaty provision which has been incorporated or
transformed into the internal legal order as a rule receives the same sta-
tus as other national law provisions of the same kind, and the rule lex
posterior derogat legi priori will apply. In the case of a provision which
applies as international law, the status is not so self-evident and needs
determination by international or national law and/or practice.
In both a monist and a dualist system, however, it is clear that pro-
visions of a treaty can be effective only if these ultimately take precedence
over municipal law in the event of conflict. Therefore, no matter what its
domestic law provides in that respect, a State is internationally responsi-
ble if the application of its domestic law results in a violation of a treaty.
At the international plane, the State cannot invoke its internal law as
justification for this violation.40 With respect to Community law the
Court of Justice of the European Communities has established that
[t]he integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions
which derive from the Community, and more generally the terms and
the spirit of the Treaty, make it impossible for the States, as a corol-
lary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over
a legal system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. 41
It is indeed logical that, where two or more parties conclude an
agreement, one of them cannot unilaterally modify its conditions or frus-
trate its implementation. Therefore, what the EC Court held for Com-
38. As was indicated above, all questions of direct applicability of EC law are to be referred to
the EC Court via the preliminary ruling procedure of article 177 of the EEC Treaty.
39. For a list of some "direct effect" cases and for further details, see Schermers, Netherlands,
supra note 19, at 114-16; Henry Schermers, Some Recent Cases Delaying the Direct Effect of Interna-
tional Treaties in Dutch Law, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 266 (1989).
40. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 27.




munity law, is the general situation under international law. As the
Permanent Court of International Justice stated in 1930:
[I]t is a generally accepted principle of international law that in rela-
tions between Powers who are Contracting Parties to a treaty, the pro-
visions of municipal law cannot prevail over those of the treaty.
42
In the Dutch legal system, as to the issue of precedence, Article 94 of the
Netherlands Constitution provides that legislation in force within the
Kingdom shall not apply if this application would be incompatible with
provisions of treaties which are binding on everyone 43 or of provisions of
decisions by international organizations of that same self-executing char-
acter.4  The impact of this provision is far-reaching and demonstrates
the importance the Netherlands attaches to international law: the Dutch
courts have to accord precedence to self-executing treaty provisions over
all national legal provisions which are not in conformity therewith, be it
antecedent or posterior domestic law and be it statutory law, law enacted
by executive or local authorities, or even constitutional law.45 In this
matter, too, the express provision in the Netherlands Constitution since
1953 was a codification of a rule that was already established by case law,
though not with all clarity as far as the precedence over posterior domes-
tic law was concerned.
46
By according precedence to the treaty provision over a conflicting
provision of national law the court is not nullifying, repealing or amend-
ing the latter.47 The court only refrains from applying it. The provision
remains in force, though the Netherlands are, of course, internationally
duty-bound to remedy the situation through the appropriate procedure.
III. THE PROCESS OF TREATY-MAKING IN THE
DUTCH LEGAL ORDER
[E]xcept in certain specified cases, consent for the Kingdom of the
Netherlands to be bound by a treaty cannot be given unless the treaty
42. Advisory Opinion No. 17, Interpretation of the Convention between Greece and Bulgaria
Respecting Reciprocal Emigration, 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17, at 32 (July 31).
43. If municipal legislation is incompatible with treaty provisions which are not "binding on
everyone" (self-executing), the former must be applied, although it must, of course, be withdrawn or
amended as soon as possible by the competent organ(s).
44. It is considered a highly exceptional feature of Dutch constitutional law that it extends the
precedence accorded to treaties over municipal law to international decisions as well. Daes, supra
note 8, at 6. It goes without saying that this applies, only to legally binding decisions.
45. That this was indeed meant to be the case is clear from the legal history of the comparable
Article 65 of the 1953 version of the Netherlands Constitution; see Erades, supra note 8, at 426.
46. See Erades, supra note 8, at 421-24.
47. For examples of cases where the Dutch courts have given priority to treaties which con-
flicted with domestic Statutes both of earlier and of later dates, see, Schermers, Netherlands, supra
note 19, at 114.
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has been approved by Parliament. In practice the rule is interpreted in
such a way as to strike a balance between the Government's need to
conduct an efficient and effective foreign policy and Parliament's need
to exercise proper supervision over that policy. 48
A. The Power to Conclude Treaties
The Netherlands Constitution does not contain an explicit provision
on the treaty-making power in the Kingdom. Article 90 of the Constitu-
tion states that the Government shall promote the development of the
international legal order. It is a constitutional principle that all policy,
foreign and otherwise, is considered to be the collective responsibility of
the Government in conjunction with the Parliament. According to Arti-
cle 45(3) of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers (Ministerraad)
shall consider and decide upon overall government policy and shall pro-
mote the coherence thereof. Foreign policy forms part of overall govern-
ment policy.
In the Netherlands, treaties are concluded by or with the authority
of the Crown (Le., the King/Queen together with the responsible Minis-
ter, in this case the Minister for Foreign Affairs). A Royal Decree has
conferred a general authorization on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to
conclude those treaties (i e., signing a treaty and expressing consent to be
bound by a treaty) that do not require formal ratification, or to appoint a
proxy to do this on the Minister's behalf.49 In practice, however, any
member of the Council of Ministers in consultation with the Minister of
Foreign Affairs may initiate negotiations. As to the application of the
constitutional information procedure 50 with regard to politically impor-
tant treaties, the Government has recently expressed its intention to in-
form Parliament in the future at the beginning of negotiations and not at
a later stage (albeit with reserving a certain degree of discretion in view
of its obligations vis-d-vis its treaty parties).
5 '
When Parliament has approved the treaty, the consent to be bound
by the treaty will be expressed, in the case of ratification, by the Head of
State and in all other cases by the Minister for Foreign Affairs or some-
48. Sondaal, supra note 6, at 180.
49. Royal Decree No. 53 (Mar. 6, 1950), Bijlage bij de Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer
[Appendix to the Proceedings of the Second Chamber] 1979/80, 15 049 (R 1100), No. 7, at 4 & No.
10, at 2.
50. Embodied in Article 68 of the Constitution, which reads as follows: Ministers and State
Secretaries shall provide orally or in writing the Chambers either separately or in joint session, with
any information requested by one or more members, provided that the provision of such information
does not conflict with the interests of the State.
51. See Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer [Proceedings of the Second Chamber] [hereinafter
HTK], 1991/92, 21 214 (R 1375), No. 10, at 1-2.
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one authorized by the latter. Especially in light of the ever increasing
interdependence of more and more questions, other ministers have grad-
ually become more involved in foreign affairs which directly affect their
ministries. In practice, the central co-ordinating role of the Minister for
Foreign Affairs in respect of foreign policy has, therefore, boosted
considerably.
B. Procedures at the National Level
1. The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers decides as a rule on the desirability of be-
coming a party to a treaty and whether parliamentary approval will be
sought expressly or tacitly. 52 If signing the treaty is necessary, this is
done with authorization of the Head of State or the Minister for Foreign
Affairs. After the text of the treaty has been adopted and, when neces-
sary, the treaty has been signed, the Head of State consults the Council of
State concerning the submission of the treaty to Parliament for approval.
2. The Council of State
The Council of State (Raad van State) is the general and highest
advisory body to the Government.5 3 Article 73(1) of the Constitution
states that the Council of State shall be consulted on proposals for the
approval of treaties before these proposals are submitted to Parliament.
5 4
The Council of State is the "final" adviser before the Government makes
its decision about whether or not to submit the treaty to Parliament for
approval. Thus, the Council of State advises after any other advisory
body which the Government must or chooses to consult has presented its
recommendations, so that it can take these other recommendations into
account in its report. The Council of State's role is limited in that it is
not feasible for it to propose any amendment to the treaty's text, since
this text has already been fixed by the time its opinion is sought. Sondaal
elucidates the Council of State's role as follows:
The Council also has an influence on the type of parliamentary ap-
proval (tacit or explicit), the Explanatory Memorandum or Note pub-
lished with the treaty, the approving Act and the implementing
52. Treaties which do not require parliamentary approval and do not relate to vital matters of
foreign policy may be concluded without being considered and decided upon by the Council of
Ministers. Sondaal, supra note 6, at 194.
53. Under Chapter 4 of the Constitution the Council of State is entrusted with important advi-
sory and judicial tasks. Under Article 13 of the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the
Council also acts as Council of State for the Kingdom if and when the need arises. See generally
RAAD VAN STATE: 450 JAAR [COUNCIL OF STATE: 450 YEARS] (1981).
54. See also Council of State Act, sec. 15.
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legislation. As far as the Act is concerned it could, for example, influ-
ence the decision whether to enter reservations or make declarations
on becoming party to the treaty and the content and formulation of
such reservations or declarations. It is in the area of implementing
legislation (the need for it and its form and content) that the Council is
able to do full justice to its role as legislative advisor. In general the
Council's recommendations show that it examines proposals to Parlia-
ment in the light of the Constitution, existing Acts of Parliament, gen-
eral principles of law and aspects of public interest. The Council does
not attempt to exercise any political influence. 5"
Once the report of the Council of State has been commented upon
by Government-and if, in the very exceptional case that the Council of
State recommends the King/Queen not to submit the treaty to Parlia-
ment for approval, the Government decides not to follow the Council's
report56 -the Head of State submits the treaty to Parliament for express
approval or authorizes the Minister for Foreign Affairs to submit the
treaty to Parliament for tacit approval.
3. Procedures for Obtaining Parliamentary Approval
General
The Netherlands Parliament is named the "States-General" (Staten-
Generaal).57 It is composed of two chambers, viz., the Second Chamber
(Lower House) with 150 members elected by universal suffrage by all
citizens over the age of eighteen, and the First Chamber (Upper House or
Senate) with 75 members, elected by the directly elected members of the
Provincial Councils. The First Chamber may adopt or reject proposals
which have passed the Second Chamber, but has no right of amendment.
Once the Council of State has made its final recommendations, the
treaty is submitted to Parliament for approval unless the Council of State
advises the King/Queen not to do so and this advice is followed by the
Government. The Government has described the nature and effect of the
approval of treaties by the States-General as follows:
Legally the States-General are free to withhold their approval from a
treaty; according to Dutch constitutional practice they can also post-
pone their decision on the proposal for approval presented by the Gov-
ernment. As long as the approval prescribed by Article 60 para 2 of the
Constitution has not taken place, the Crown has no right to ratify the
treaty. However, as soon as the approval has been given by the States-
General, the Crown has the constitutional freedom - but not the obli-
gation - to proceed to ratification. This is the essence of the
55. Sondaal, supra note 6, at 196.
56. See, e.g., the report of the Council of State and the Supplementary Report of the Govern-
ment on the 1990 Schengen Agreement, HTK 1990/91, 22 140, B.
57. The terms "States-General" and "Parliament" are used interchangeably in this article.
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approval. 58
Until 1953, the Constitution did not prescribe a specific procedure for the
approval of treaties.5 9 As from 1953, the Constitution indicates two pro-
cedures for the parliamentary approval of treaties, Le., express approval
and tacit approval. 6°
The 1983 revision of the Constitution decreased the number of pro-
visions dealing with the procedure of approval. The only provision deal-
ing with this matter left is Article 91:
1. The Kingdom shall not be bound by treaties, nor shall such trea-
ties be denounced, without the prior approval of the States-Gen-
eral. The cases in which approval is not required shall be specified
by Statute.
2. The manner in which approval shall be granted shall be laid down
by Statute, which may provide for the possibility of tacit approval.
3. Any provisions of a treaty that conflict with the Constitution or
which lead to conflicts with it may be approved by the Chambers
of the States-General only if at least two-thirds of the votes cast
are in favour.
Article 91 delegates to the legislature the regulation of cases where par-
liamentary approval is not required, and how approval is to be granted.
A Bill concerning approval and publication of treaties has been submit-
ted to the States-General to this end.61 Consequently, the rules on
treaty-making are in a transitory stage. Until then, under Additional Ar-
ticle XXI of the Constitution, the relevant constitutional provisions of
the 1972 Constitution will remain in force. These are Article 61 on tacit
approval 62 and Article 62 on cases where approval is not required. 63
The constitutional provisions which presently deal with the ap-
proval of treaties may be summarized as follows:
a. The general requirement of prior parliamentary approval:
9 Article 91(1) of the Constitution;
58. See Bijlage bij de Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer [Annex to the Proceedings of the
Second Chamber] 1965/66, 8380 (R 506), No. 6, at 6, translation in Johan G. Lammers, Municipal
Aspects of Treaty-Making by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, in 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
NETHERLANDS 333, 344 (Haro van Panhuys et a]. eds., 1978).
59. Since 1922, the Constitution, Article 58(3), required, however, a Statute for accession to
and renunciation of treaties.
60. Art. 61 of the 1953 Constitution. See van Panhuys, supra note 1, at 547-49; see also van
Panhuys, supra note 25, at 96-97.
61. HTK, 1988/91, 21 214 (R 1375). The Bill will not bring about any substantial changes in
the approval procedure. See J.G.E. van den Brandhof, Wetsontwerp inzake de goedkeuring en
bekendmaking van verdragen [Bill Concerning Approval and Publication of Treaties], 16 TUD-
SCHRIFT VOOR OPENBAAR BESTUUR 264 (1990).
62. Even though Article 61 deals with tacit approval, the Government has pointed out that this
provision will also be applied in the case of express approval. Sondaal, supra note 6, at 197-96.
63. See generally Municipal Aspect of Treaty-Making by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, supra
note 58, at 341-44.
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b. The exemption from this rule:
* Article 91(1) and Additional Article XXI(1) of the Constitution
juncto Article 62 of the 1972 Constitution;
c. The form in which approval is granted:
* Article 91(2) and Additional Article XXI(1) of the Constitution
juncto Article 61 of the 1972 Constitution;
d. The approval of treaties which conflict with the Constitution:
* Article 91(3) and Additional Article XXI of the Constitution
juncto Article 61 of the 1972 Constitution.
Treaties which conflict with the Constitution can only be approved by a
two-thirds majority of the votes cast (Article 91(3)). It is within the ex-
clusive competence of Parliament to decide whether a treaty contains
such a conflict, but the Government and the Council of State may, of
course, express their opinions on the issue. Thus far, the States-General
has only twice decided that a treaty was in conflict with the Constitution.
The first occasion was in connection with the approval of the Treaty of
May 27, 1952, establishing the European Defence Community.64 The
second was in 1962 when a part of the Kingdom (Netherlands New
Guinea) was transferred to Indonesia. 65
Express Approval
The States-General can lay down their express approval of the treaty and
the reservations (if any) only in a Statute. The King/Queen sends a
Royal Message to the Second Chamber containing the Bill concerning
approval, accompanied by a document called the Explanatory Memoran-
dum (memorie van toelichting) explaining the treaty and the reservations
to be made (if any), and stating the Government's reasons why the
Netherlands should become a party to it. At that moment the report of
the Council of State is made public. From this moment on the normal
legislative procedure applies.
Tacit Approval
The possibility of tacit approval was introduced in the 1953 Constitu-
tion.66 The underlying reason was that it was considered to be too heavy
a burden for the States-General to deal with an average of about 200
treaties per year. In practice, the procedure of tacit approval is more
frequently used than that of express approval.
Since 1983, the details on the system of tacit approval are no longer
64. See Act of Jan. 22, 1954, Stb. No. 25, art. 6.




contained in the Constitution. These will be incorporated in the above-
mentioned Act on approval and publication of treaties. A treaty is sub-
mitted for tacit approval by a letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to
the Chairpersons of both Chambers of the States-General. Appended to
the letter is an Explanatory Note (toelichtende nota) setting forth the
substance of the treaty, the reservations (if any), and the Government's
reasons for adhering to the treaty. In this case, too, the report of the
Council of State is made public. Tacit approval is considered to have
been given, unless, within thirty days after a submission of the treaty to
both Chambers of the States-General for approval, a statement has been
made by or on behalf of either Chamber, or by at least one-fifth of the
constitutional membership of either Chamber, expressing the wish that
the treaty should be subjected to express approval. The period of thirty
days begins on the day following the receipt of the letter. Intervention by
or on behalf of either Chamber in the procedure of tacit approval leads to
the procedure of express approval.
67
Concluding Remarks
The procedures of tacit and express approval are of equal value. It is for
the Government in the first place to decide whether or not it will submit
a treaty for tacit approval. Lammers describes the Government's choice
of procedure for approval as follows:
The Government, however, will not make this choice arbitrarily. For
precious time may be lost and much extra effort involved if the States-
General decide than an agreement submitted for tacit approval must
be subjected to express approval. In order to prevent such incidents as
far as possible the Government will initiate the procedure of express
approval when it foresees that the States-General may wish to discuss
an agreement on account of its political importance and/or its contro-
versial nature. Express approval is, moreover, the rule when new legis-
lation has to be enacted or existing provisions adjusted in order to
implement the agreement. In such cases the bill for the implementa-
tion of the agreement is presented to the States-General either before
or together with the Bill of Approval.
68
4. Exemptions from the Requirement of Parliamentary Approval
During the preparatory stage of the 1953 revision of the Constitu-
tion, the question was raised how to cope with treaties which are either
so unimportant or so urgent or secret that parliamentary discussions
seem undesirable. The 1953 Constitution enumerated four well-defined
67. Article 91 and Additional Article XXI of the Constitution juncto Article 61 of the 1972
Constitution.
68. Lammers, supra note 58, at 347.
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categories of treaties which could be ratified by the Government without
parliamentary approval.69 The 1983 Constitution no longer contains an
enumeration of categories of treaties which do not require parliamentary
approval. Such an enumeration will be included in the earlier mentioned
Act on approval and publication of treaties. The exemptions laid down in
Article 62 of the 1972 Constitution are still applicable in virtue of Addi-
tional Article XXI of the Constitution. These are the following four:
(a) if the agreement is one with respect to which this has been provided
by Statute;
(b) if the agreement is exclusively concerned with the implementation
of an approved agreement, provided the Act of Approval of the lat-
ter agreement did not stipulate otherwise;
(c) if the agreement does not impose considerable financial obligations
on the Kingdom and is concluded for a period not exceeding one
year;
(d) if in exceptional cases of a cogent nature it would be clearly detri-
mental to the interests of the Kingdom that the agreement shall not
enter into force until approval has been given.
70
An agreement as referred to under (d) shall, however, be submitted
as soon as possible to parliamentary approval postfactum. If approval of
the agreement is withheld, the agreement shall be terminated as soon as
legally possible. Unless it would manifestly conflict with the interests of
the Kingdom, the agreement shall only be entered into under the reserva-
tion that it will be terminated in case approval is withheld. Wildhaber
considers this to be "a felicitous amalgamation of expediency and celerity
on the one hand, democracy and representative government on the
other."
71
Decisions of international organizations are not treated the same
way as treaties under the Dutch Constitution. If by, or in accordance
with, the treaty establishing the organization one or more of its organs
have been given the power to take binding decisions, these decisions do
not need parliamentary approval in order to have binding force in the
Netherlands. Article 92 of the Constitution provides that, with due ob-
servance, if necessary, of Article 91(3)--two-thirds majority requirement
in the case of a treaty which conflicts with the Constitution-legislative,
administrative and judicial powers may be conferred on international or-
69. Article 62.
70. For more details on each exemption, see Lammers, supra note 58, at 348-53.
71. WILDHABER, supra note 19, at 146.
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ganizations by, or in virtue of, a treaty. Thus only the treaty itself re-
quires parliamentary approval.
There are also cases in which a treaty creates a procedure by which
the representatives of the Contracting Parties may make binding deci-
sions to implement or specify provisions of the treaty. Thus, in a recent
case, Article 131 of the Convention of June 19, 1990, Implementing the
Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Controls at the Common Bor-
ders Concluded Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux
Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Re-
public at Schengen on June 14, 1985 ("1990 Schengen Agreement") 72
provides for the establishment of an Executive Committee, consisting of
representatives of the Contracting Parties. The Executive Committee
has inter alia the power to make binding decisions implementing the
1990 Agreement. In its report on the Bill concerning approval of the
1990 Schengen Agreement, the Council of State raised the question
whether this decision-making power, which does not leave sufficient
room for parliamentary approval, 73 would be in conformity with the
Dutch Constitution, since the Committee could not be considered an in-
ternational organization. 74 In its reaction the Netherlands Government
took the position that indeed the Committee was not an international
organization, but that its decisions, by analogy, could be treated as deci-
sions of international organizations in the sense of Article 92 of the Con-
stitution. 75 In view of the legal history of Article 92, which shows that
the drafters were of the opinion that Article 92 should be applied restric-
tively, the correctness of the Government's position would seem not to be
beyond discussion. A more correct point of view would seem to be that
the decisions concerned are international agreements to implement the
1985 Schengen Agreement. But then the Netherlands Parliament should
be able to stipulate in the Act of Approval that it reserves for itself the
power of approval. It is not clear yet what the position of Parliament
will be in this case.
72. The 1990 Schengen Agreement is a comprehensive treaty of 142 articles. The German,
French, and Dutch texts of the treaty are equally authentic and have been published in 1990
Tractatenblad No. 145. See also 30 I.L.M. 68 (1991).
73. Article 132(3) only provides that at the request of a Contracting Party, the final decision of
the Executive Committee may be postponed for no more than two months after the submission of
the draft, but this period is not sufficient for a procedure of express approval, where also time has to
be reserved for the report of the Council. of State.
74. For the report of the Council of State on the 1990 Schengen Agreement, see HTK 1990/91,
22 140, B.
75. For the Government's Supplementary Report (nader rapport), see id..
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C. Provisional Application
The preparation of Bills concerning approval and the procedure of
approval itself are time-consuming. In order to cope with situations
where this could be a major problem, the system of provisional applica-
tion of a treaty pending its approval by Parliament and its ratification
and entry into force has been introduced. 76 The provisional application
of a treaty before its entry into force is allowed in the Dutch system
insofar as the obligations the Government has to fulfil under the provi-




The Government has the constitutional right to decide whether it
will proceed to ratification or not. The power to ratify a treaty may not
be delegated to other State organs. The Parliament may control the rati-
fication of treaties as follows:
While from a legal point of view the King has the right to ratify or not
to ratify an agreement which has been approved by Parliament, this
does not mean that Parliament is not allowed to exercise political con-
trol. Thus, it will still be possible for the States-General to invite the
Government to account for a ratification which has taken place in spite
of an important change of circumstances, or for any omission or delay
in the ratification of an agreement. 78
It is Dutch practice to insert the text of ratification and clauses concern-
ing the territorial validity of the treaty in the document of ratification.
IV. QUALIFICATIONS ADDED TO TREATIES
A. General
When expressing its willingness to be bound by a treaty, the King-
dom may make declarations (interpretative or otherwise) and enter reser-
vations; the latter of course only to the extent allowed by the treaty
76. Sondaal distinguishes three types of provisional application. The first type of provisional
application, provided for by the treaty itself, results from the issue by each individual State of a
declaration to this effect. The second type occurs when States bind one another to apply a treaty
provisionally by a separate treaty. The third type occurs when the treaty itself contains a clause
stating that it is to be applied provisionally from a certain date. See Sondaal, supra note 6, at 226-29.
77. See generally E.W. VIERDAG & G.W. MAAS GEESTERANUS, SPANNINGEN TUSSEN RECHT
& PRAKTUK IN HET VERDRAGENRECHT - RECHTEN PRAKTIUK IN HET VERDRAGENRECHT:
PREADVIEZEN VOOR DE NEDERLANDSE VERENIGING VOOR INTERNATIONAAL RECHT [THE TEN-
SIONS BETWEEN LAW & PRACTICE IN LAW OF TREATIES - LAW & PRACTICE IN THE LAW OF
TREATIES: REPORTS TO THE DUTCH ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 7-35 (1989).
78. Lammers, supra note 58, at 345.
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concerned and by general international law. 79 The Council of State,
through its advisory report, may influence the decision whether to enter
reservations or make declarations on adhering to the treaty and the con-
tent and formulation of such reservations or declarations.
According to Dutch legislative tradition, the text of reservations to-
be-made are included in the Bill concerning approval of the treaty in the
case of express approval, while in the case of tacit approval they are re-
ferred to in the Explanatory Note. Declarations are always set out in the
Explanatory Memorandum or Note.
B. Reservations
In general, the Government decides whether reservations should be
made. The Government submits the proposed reservations to Parliament
for approval. Since in the case of express approval the proposed reserva-
tions are included in the Bill concerning approval, first of all the Council
of State may propose to delete or amend the proposed reservations, or to
include additional reservations. Next, during the procedure of parlia-
mentary approval, Parliament has the power, directly or indirectly, to
achieve that certain reservations are made by the Government or that
proposed reservations are deleted or phrased differently. According to
Article 84(1) of the Constitution, a Bill, presented by or on behalf of the
Government that has not yet been passed by the Second Chamber or by a
joint session of the States-General may be amended by the Second Cham-
ber or the joint session, as the case may be, on the proposal of one or
more members, or by the Government. Thus, the Second Chamber or
the joint session of the States-General may formulate reservations. The
First Chamber does not have this right of amendment. It may only
adopt or reject legislation that has passed the Second Chamber, but has
no right of amendment (Article 85 of the Constitution).80 Consequently,
in respect of the Bill concerning approval of the treaty the Second Cham-
ber may amend the reservations proposed by the Government, 81 may
79. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, arts. 19-23. See also Advisory Opinion, Reservations
to the Convention on Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15.
80. The First Chamber, for instance, rejected the Bill concerning the approval of the Agree-
ment Establishing a European Foundation (the Dutch text of the treaty is published in 1982
Tractatenblad No. 92). The First Chamber advised the Government to renegotiate the treaty. See
HTK 1982/84, 17 852; Handelingen van de Eerste Kamer [Proceedings of the First Chamber]
[HEK], 1984/86, 17 852; HTK 1986/87, 19 700, ch. 5, No. 113.
81. For instance, the Government submitted a proposed reservation to Parliament for approval
with regard to article 13(1) of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27,
1977, 1137 U.N.T.S. 93; 1977 Tractatenblad No. 63; 1985 Tractatenblad No. 66. The Second Cham-
ber amended the Government's proposed reservation by making it more absolute. Compare 1985
Tractatenblad No. 116 with HTK 1979/80, 15 971 (R 1132), Nos. 1-4.
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strike them off the Bill,82 and may include new ones, 83 while the First
Chamber may reject the Bill if it does not agree with the reservations as
proposed therein or is of the opinion that certain reservations should be
made. If the Government does not agree with the changes introduced by
the Second Chamber and/or proposed by the First Chamber, it may still
decide not to ratify the treaty.
Over the last twenty years, the Netherlands has attached reserva-
tions to the following twelve treaties:
1. the European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal
Judgments of May 28, 1970;
8 4
2. the Convention on the Legitimation of Marriage of September 10,
1970;85
3. the Convention on the Reduction of the Number of Cases of State-
lessness of September 13, 1973;86
4. the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic
Agents of December 14, 1973;87
5. the Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations
of October 2, 1973;88
6. the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of Janu-
ary 27, 1977;
7. the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions
Relating to Maintenance Obligations of October 2, 1973;89
8. the Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences of April
6, 1974;90
82. See, e.g., the Government's proposed reservation to the Protocol Amending the Single Con-
vention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Mar. 25, 1972, 1980 Tractatenblad No. 184. Compare 1986
Tractatenblad No. 720 with HTK 1981/82, 17 360 (R 1202), Nos. 1-3. See also, e.g., certain pro-
posed reservations to the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, Nov. 24,
1977, 1978 Tractatenblad No. 70; 1983 Tractatenblad No. 45. Compare 1983 Tractatenblad No. 45
with HTK 1979/80, 16 075 (R 1142), Nos. 1-3.
83. See, e.g, the added reservation to the European Charter of Local Self-Government, Oct. 15,
1985, 1987 Tractatenblad No. 63; 1991 Tractatenblad No. 61. Compare 1991 Tractatenblad No. 61
with HTK 1988/89, 20 586, Nos. 5-6.
84. 973 U.N.T.S. 57; 1971 Tractatenblad No. 137; 1972 Tractatenblad No. 15; 1987 Tractaten-
blad No. 162.
85. 1081 U.N.T.S. 247; 1972 Tractatenblad No. 61; 1977 Tractatenblad No. 114.
86. 1081 U.N.T.S. 283; 1974 Tractatenblad No. 32; 1985 Tractatenblad No. 70.
87. 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; 1981 Tractatenblad No. 69; 1988 Tractatenblad No. 166.
88. 1056 U.N.T.S. 199; 1974 Tractatenblad No. 86; 1977 Tractatenblad No. 179; 1981
Tractatenblad No. 20; 1984 Tractatenblad No. 148.
89. 1021 U.N.T.S. 209; 1974 Tractatenblad No. 85; 1981 Tractatenblad No. 21; 1984
Tractatenblad No. 149.
90. 1979 Tractatenblad No. 177; 1980 Tractatenblad No. 165; 1983 Tractatenblad No. 100;
1987 Tractatenblad No. 130.
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9. the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers of
November 24, 1977;
10. the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters of March 17, 1978;9'
11. the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduc-
tion of October 25, 1980;92
12. the European Charter of Local Self-Government of October 15,
1985.
Reservations are included in the instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession because, in conjunction with that instrument, they
specify precisely to what the Kingdom considers itself bound.
The Government decides whether reservations should be with-
drawn. The Government submits the withdrawal of reservations to Par-
liament for approval.
C. Declarations (Interpretational or Otherwise)
Declarations are made in writing, but separate from the instrument
itself. Declarations have no effect on the nature and scope of the obliga-
tions under the treaty and remain, therefore, distinct from the Act
whereby the Kingdom declares itself bound. The declarations are not
proposed in the Bill concerning approval of the treaty but in the Explan-
atory Memorandum or Note accompanying the Bill. Here again, first of
all the Council of State may propose to delete or change the declarations
proposed in the Explanatory Memorandum or Note, or to include new
ones. The Second Chamber cannot itself amend the Explanatory Memo-
randum or Note, but it and also the First Chamber may propose dele-
tions, amendments and inclusions, and may adopt motions to that effect.
If the Government refuses to follow these recommendations, the Parlia-
ment can reject the Bill concerning approval.
In case of doubt whether a certain point of interpretation can be
made in a declaration or amounts to a reservation, it is practice in the
Netherlands to phrase it as a reservation and to include it in the Act of
Approval. The fact that the Netherlands attached the following explana-
tion of its reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights may serve as an illustration:
Clarify that although the reservations [... ] are partly of an interpreta-
tional nature, the Kingdom of the Netherlands has preferred reserva-
tions to interpretational declarations in all cases, since if the latter
91. 1979 Tractatenblad No. 121; 1982 Tractatenblad No. 11; 1990 Tractatenblad No. 118.
92. 1987 Tractatenblad No. 139; 1990 Tractatenblad No. 96.
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form were used doubt might arise concerning whether the text of the
Covenant allows for the interpretation put upon it. By using the reser-
vation-form the Kingdom of the Netherlands wishes to ensure in all
cases that the relevant obligations arising out of the Covenant will not
apply to the Kingdom, or will apply only in the way indicated.
93
D. Acceptance of and Objections to Reservations
The Government decides whether objections should be presented to
reservations entered by other States which are deemed unacceptable.
Objections are made in writing but separate from the instrument of ratifi-
cation. The Government informs Parliament about the objections it in-
tends to make to reservations made by other States en marge of the
approval procedure.
During the parliamentary debates concerning the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties in the Netherlands, the Government was
asked whether it would submit for parliamentary approval any accept-
ance of and/or objections to reservations made by other parties (as indi-
cated in Article 21 of the Convention) made after the Parliament has
approved the treaty for the Netherlands. 94 The Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs stated that with regard to reservations by other parties made after
parliamentary approval of the treaty for the Netherlands, the Govern-
ment decides about possible steps without prior consultation of Parlia-
ment. The Government's decision is subsequently published in the
Tractatenblad. The Minister pointed out that the period for acceptance
of or objection to reservations made by other parties is too short95 to
submit these for parliamentary approval. 96 Therefore, the Minister rec-
ommended the States-General to take an active stance in this matter and
to closely monitor such reservations made, particularly by asking the
Government for an explanation of its intentions whenever it is informed
of reservations by other parties which the Parliament does not consider
prima facie legally or politically correct. In the Minister's view, the
Monthly Report (Maandbericht) of the Tractatenblad would offer Par-
liament a possibility to keep track of these reservations.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Can it be said that the Government's application of the principle
93. 1978 Tractatenblad No. 177, at 37; UNITED NATIONS CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
HUMAN RIGHTS: STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/5, at 42-43
(1987).
94. HTK 1982/83, 17 798 (R 1227), No. 39, at 5422-23.
95. See Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 20.
96. HTK 1982/83, 17 798 (R 1227), No. 39, at 5424.
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that, with a few exceptions, treaties must receive parliamentary ap-
proval before they can bind the Kingdom, is satisfactory? Is Parlia-
ment actually involved in the decision-making as intended? In my
opinion, the answer to both these questions is a resounding 'yes.'...
Has a balance been achieved, as the constitutional provisions intended,
between parliamentary involvement and efficiency of government ac-
tion? Has the balance not swung towards Parliament? The answers to
these questions, in my opinion, must clearly be 'yes' to the first and
'no' to the second.97
Since the 1953 revision of the Constitution, the division of powers be-
tween Government and Parliament regarding treaties has at last clearly
been established. The treaty-making power has been put more under the
control of the States-General. 98 This control not only concerns the ap-
proval of a treaty but also the reservations or declarations, if any, accom-
panying the ratification. Thus, a fair balance is achieved between the
primary duty of the Government to promote the international legal order
and Parliament's control over the way this duty is exercised.
97. Sondaal, supra note 6, at 217.
98. 1953 Constitution, arts. 60 and 62. See van Panhuys, supra note 1, at 543-47; see also van
Panhuys, supra note 25, at 91-96.
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